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1 Introduction
There is a large literature that has used Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) models
to examine the macroeconomic e¤ects of changes in policy-controlled interest rates (e.g.
Bernanke and Blinder 1992; Bernanke and Mihov 1995; Christiano et al. 1999; Peersman
and Smets 2003). VAR models are reduced form multivariate representations of macro-
economic variables. By imposing a minimum set of restrictions, it is possible to identify
the structural shocks that drive the variables, such as exogenous innovations to the policy-
controlled interest rate. Once the shocks are identied, the SVAR model allows to study
the dynamic responses of the variables to the shocks. There is considerable agreement in
this literature that a decline in the policy rate leads to a hump-shaped temporary rise in
economic activity, while prices increase persistently. These e¤ects are typically used as a
benchmark for the construction of monetary general equilibrium models of the business
cycle (e.g. Christiano et al. 2005; Smets and Wouters 2007).
In contrast, little is known about the e¤ectiveness and pass-through of monetary policy
measures that expand central bank balance sheets for a given policy rate.1 Indeed, this
is exactly what the European Central Bank (ECB) and other major central banks have
done in the aftermath of the nancial crisis to counter the risks to macroeconomic and
nancial stability. The ECB, for instance, shifted from a variable rate tender to a xed
rate tender with full allotment, the pool of collateral accepted for renancing operations
has been enlarged and liquidity to banks has been provided at longer maturities than in
the pre-crisis period. The ECB also intervened in the secondary markets of some euro area
government bonds, conducted several covered bond purchase programs, and announced
outright purchases of asset-backed securities in the summer of 2014. A better understand-
ing of the transmission mechanism and impact of such policies on the macroeconomy is
not only essential for policymakers, it is also important to construct theoretical monetary
models for the analysis of unconventional monetary policy and the nancial crisis.
In this study, we apply the SVAR methodology to analyze the macroeconomic e¤ects
1The literature on the e¤ects of so-called unconventional monetary policy, however, has been growing
recently. Theoretical examples are Curdia and Woodford (2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2011). Empirical
applications are Peersman (2011), Ciccarelli et al. (2013), Fahr et al. (2013), Lenza et al. (2010) and
Gambacorta et al. (2014).
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and transmission mechanism of shocks to the ECBs balance sheet that are orthogonal
to real economy uctuations, disturbances in nancial markets, changes in the demand
for central bank liquidity, and conventional innovations to the policy rate. We focus
exclusively on the period since the onset of the nancial crisis. More precisely, we rst
estimate a benchmark monthly SVAR model for the euro area containing output, consumer
prices, the policy rate, central bank total assets, the CISS indicator of nancial stress,
and the spread between the EONIA and the policy rate over the sample period 2008M1-
2013M12. We nd that an exogenous expansion in total assets leads to a signicant but
temporary rise in output and prices. The dynamic e¤ects are very similar to the ones
typically found in the literature on conventional interest rate innovations. This conrms
that a central bank can also use its balance sheet to stabilize the real economy without
altering the policy rate. Notice, however, that the estimations represent the average impact
of a generic series of exogenous balance sheet innovations during the crisis period. The
shocks are a mixture of di¤erent policy actions a¤ecting the ECBs balance sheet of which
the e¤ects are not necessarily the same. Some caution when interpreting the results is
thus required.
In a second step, we extend the VAR model and also estimate the impact of balance
sheet shocks on a set of nancial market and banking sector variables in order to shed
more light on the transmission channels. On the one hand, we nd that an exogenous rise
in the ECBs balance sheet improves bank lending conditions for households and rms in
the euro area, increasing the volume of bank lending. On the other hand, equity prices
rise, the exchange rate depreciates, and there is a fall in government bond yields and the
intra-euro area government bond spreads vis-à-vis Germany. These results suggest that
non-standard monetary policy measures that a¤ect the balance sheet of the ECB are also
e¤ective to counter risks to nancial stability.
Finally, we estimate the impact of the balance sheet shocks on output and prices in
individual euro area countries. The e¤ects on prices are quite similar across countries.
The output e¤ects, however, are more diverse. In particular, we nd a more subdued
or insignicant impact in those countries that have been more a¤ected by the nancial
crisis (e.g. Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, the Netherlands and Spain). The responses of output
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across countries turn out to correlate positively with the degree of capitalization of national
banking sectors, which suggests that the solvency of the banking sector might be important
for the e¤ectiveness of the ECBs balance sheet policies, while a recapitalization of less
well-capitalized banks could potentially restore the monetary transmission mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide
an overview of the most important unconventional monetary policy measures of the ECB
in the wake of the global nancial crisis, and their inuence on the central bank balance
sheet. Section 3 presents the benchmark VAR model and the identication strategy to
isolate exogenous balance sheet innovations. Section 4 reports the results of the benchmark
estimations, whereas the impact on nancial market and banking sector variables is shown
in section 5. In section 6, we discuss the cross-country di¤erences within the euro area.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The balance sheet of the ECB and the nancial crisis
The nancial crisis has a¤ected the balance sheet of the ECB in several waves. Starting
in the summer of 2007, euro area banks su¤ered signicant losses from the fall-out of the
subprime mortgage crisis in the United States. As a consequence, banks started to have
doubts about their counterparties in the interbank market, which resulted in a shortage of
liquidity and a collapse of activity in many nancial market segments. In addition, several
banks started to build up large liquidity bu¤ers. To accommodate banksincreased (and
unpredictable) demand for liquidity, the ECB started to conduct a xed interest rate with
full allotment (FRFA) policy after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. From October 2008
onwards, banks had unlimited access to liquidity from the ECB at a pre-specied interest
rate set by the ECB, as long as they could provide the required collateral. As can be seen
in Figure 1, this resulted in a rst expansion of the ECBs balance sheet. At the same
time, the ECB also lowered its key interest rates to close to zero.
Crucial for the analysis in this paper, is that the FRFA policy has remained in place
throughout the crisis for all standard liquidity-providing operations of the ECB, although it
has been suspended temporarily for three-month operations in the spring of 2010. Specif-
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ically, the main challenge of this study lies in identifying changes in the balance sheet
that could be interpreted as exogenous monetary policy decisions, i.e. not the result of
movements in other variables. The FRFA policy, however, implies that uctuations in the
volume of liquidity distributed by the ECB to the banking sector after October 2008 are
essentially demand-driven. Nevertheless, shifts in the volume of lending to the banking
sector that are the consequence of deliberate monetary policy decisions are possible and
did happen during the sample period. In particular, the ECB has conducted a number of
non-standard monetary policy measures that raised the demand for liquidity by banks and
hence the size of its balance sheet, such as alterations to the collateral requirements for
its liquidity-providing operations. The list of eligible collateral accepted in the renancing
operations has been extended several times, e.g. in October 2008 and December 2011,
allowing banks to renance less liquid assets, expanding the balance sheet of the ECB.
On the other hand, the collateral framework has also been made more restrictive at some
points in time, e.g. by limiting the range of eligible assets or by changing haircuts.2
The ECB has also stimulated liquidity demand from the banking sector by extending
the maximum maturity of its longer-term renancing operations (LTROs). Whereas in the
pre-crisis period, the ECB only o¤ered operations with a maturity up to three months,
the maximum maturity was extended to 6 months in February 2009, then to 12 months
in June 2009. There were even two renancing operations with a maturity of 36 months
in December 2011 and March 2012 (and an option to repay the funds after one year).
As shown in Figure 1, all these operations got considerable interest by banks, boosting
the balance sheet of the ECB. Furthermore, in order to alleviate banksfunding problems
in foreign currency, the ECB has o¤ered funding in foreign currency in cooperation with
other central banks, such as USD and CHF. These operations have at times been sus-
pended and reintroduced, resulting in balance sheet uctuations that are at least partly
the consequence of policy decisions.
The ECB has also made outright asset purchases during our sample period, which
inuenced the size of its balance sheet (see Figure 1). The ECB conducted two Covered
Bond Purchase Programs (CBPP) between June 2009 and October 2012, which implied
2 In early 2009, for instance, the ECB raised its rating threshold for ABSs from one A-rating towards
two AAA-ratings at issuance.
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outright purchases of e76.4 billion in covered bonds issued by banks in the euro area.
In addition, between May 2010 and the summer of 2012, the ECB intervened in the
secondary markets of some euro area government bonds in the context of its Securities
Markets Program (SMP). Overall, the ECB bought e219.5 billion of government bonds.3
In sum, there have been several deliberate monetary policy decisions after the intro-
duction of the FRFA policy (which was also a policy decision) that had an inuence on
the balance sheet of the ECB. Hence, it should be possible to isolate exogenous monetary
policy shocks. The identication strategy to do so, will be discussed in the next section.
3 Euro area SVAR-model for the nancial crisis
3.1 Benchmark specication
Structural VAR models are typically used to estimate the macroeconomic e¤ects of con-
ventional monetary policy innovations, e.g. Christiano et al. (1999) for the United States
and Peersman and Smets (2003) for the euro area. SVARs impose very little theoretical
structure on the data and can be used to establish some relevant stylized facts. In this
paper, we also use the SVAR methodology to explore the dynamic e¤ects of unconven-
tional monetary policies. The benchmark VAR model that we consider has the following
representation:
Yt = +A (L)Yt 1 +B"t (1)
where Yt is a vector of endogenous variables,  a vector of constants, A (L) a matrix
polynomial in the lag operator L, and B the contemporaneous impact matrix of the
mutually uncorrelated disturbances ". The VARs in this study are estimated in (log)
levels, which allows for implicit cointegration relationships in the data (Sims, Stock and
Watson 1990).4
In the benchmark specication, the vector of endogenous variables Yt contains six
3Because our sample ends in 2013M12, the balance sheet measures announced over the summer of 2014,
comprising a series of targeted LTROs and purchases of covered bonds and asset-backed securities, are not
included in the estimations.
4 In this paper, given the short sample available, we do not perform an explicit analysis of the long-run
behavior of the economy.
5
euro area variables: the log of seasonally adjusted real GDP, the log of seasonally adjusted
consumer prices, the log of central bank total assets, the level of nancial stress as measured
by the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS), the spread between EONIA and the
MRO-rate, and the main renancing operations (MRO) policy rate. We use monthly data
for the period 2008M1-2013M12.5 Several empirical studies on unconventional monetary
policy use data starting before the nancial crisis, which may not be adequate to assess
the e¤ects of the policy measures that were taken in the aftermath of the nancial crisis
(e.g. Lenza et al. 2010; Giannone et al. 2012; Peersman 2011). Both banks and sovereign
bond markets in the euro area behaved very di¤erently in the nancial crisis compared to
the pre-crisis period. Moreover, before 2008, the ECB never used its balance sheet as a
policy tool to inuence macroeconomic conditions.6
The benchmark specication should capture the main macroeconomic, nancial and
monetary interactions during the nancial crisis. Output and prices represent the macro-
economic developments in our sample, while the MRO-rate captures conventional mon-
etary policy. The central bank balance sheet variable that we use in the estimations is
ECB total assets. Alternatively, one could use the liquidity surplus or the monetary base.
However, decisions related to, for instance, the SMP would then not be included. The
purchases under this program have been sterilized during our sample, and should therefore
not a¤ect the liquidity surplus or base money. Some studies on the e¤ects of unconven-
tional monetary policy (e.g. Lenza et al. 2010; Peersman 2011; Darracq-Paries and De
Santis 2013), measure unconventional monetary policy indirectly through its impact on
money market rates or on credit supply, but these variables are also driven by non-policy
and conventional monetary policy innovations.7
In order to capture nancial stress and economic risk during the sample period, we
include the CISS-indicator of Holló et al. (2012) in the benchmark VAR-model. The
5We construct a monthly measure of real GDP using the Chow-Lin interpolation procedure and monthly
industrial production as a reference series.
6One notable example of a change in the size of the balance sheet that was not related to the monetary
policy stance of the ECB, is the drop in the balance sheet prior to the changeover of national banknotes
into euro banknotes in January 2002.
7 In December 2011 the ECB decided to o¤er banks liquidity with a maturity of three years. But at the
same meeting it also decided to lower the MRO-rate with 25 basis points. Without additional information
or assumptions, it is not possible to assign a change in money market rates or credit supply of banks
observed after the December 2011 meeting to either conventional or unconventional monetary policy.
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CISS-indicator summarizes information on nancial stress in euro area money markets,
bond markets, equity markets, foreign exchange markets and nancial intermediaries.
Conditioning on such an indicator is also crucial to disentangle exogenous changes in the
central bank balance sheet from endogenous responses to nancial stress and uncertainty.
Specically, as discussed in Section 2, innovations to the balance sheet could be demand-
induced due to the FRFA policy, whereas several unconventional monetary policy measures
of the ECB were taken in direct reaction to nancial and macroeconomic jitters. Failing
to take into account the endogenous response of the balance sheet to nancial turbulence
and economic uncertainty could seriously bias the estimation results (Gambacorta et al.
2014). Indeed, Figure 2 shows that the year-on-year percentage change in total ECB assets
is closely related to the CISS indicator. The positive co-movement between both variables
mainly reects the endogenous response of the balance sheet to nancial stress.8 Finally,
the benchmark VAR includes the spread between the EONIA and the MRO-rate, which
will also be useful for the identication of exogenous balance sheet shocks.
3.2 Identication of balance sheet shocks
Isolating exogenous balance sheet shocks involves making identifying assumptions. As
explained in Section 2, uctuations in the ECBs balance sheet are a combination of
changes in monetary policy that could be interpreted as exogenous, and an endogenous
response to developments in the economy. The latter reects, in turn, the systematic
reaction of monetary policy to nancial stress and macroeconomic uctuations, as well
as the demand-driven nature of the FRFA policy.9 To identify exogenous innovations to
the balance sheet, we use a mixture of zero and sign restrictions on the contemporaneous
8The positive correlation between the size of the balance sheet and our indicator of nancial stress is
analogous to the positive correlation between interest rates and ination in conventional monetary policy
VARs. Also in that case, the positive (unconditional) correlation is mainly the result of an endogenous
response of monetary policy to changes in prices, rather than exogenous monetary policy shocks which
drive interest rates and prices in opposite directions.
9The benchmark estimations reveal that only 25 percent of the forecast error variance decomposition of
total ECB assets at horizon 0 is driven by unconventional balance sheet shocks, which even declines to 6
percent at longer horizons. Fluctuations in the ECBs balance sheet are thus mainly endogenously driven
by other shocks in the economy, which underscores the importance of isolating exogenous innovations.
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matrix B in equation (1), which can be found in Table 1.
Table 1 - Identication of an (unconventional) central bank balance sheet shock
Output Prices CB Total Assets CISS EONIA-MRO spread policy rate
0 0 > 0 6 0 6 0 0
First, we assume that there is only a lagged impact of a balance sheet shock on output
and consumer prices, i.e. the contemporaneous impact on both variables is restricted to
be zero. Conversely, innovations to output and prices are allowed to have an immediate
e¤ect on the balance sheet of the central bank. This assumption, which is also made in
most VAR-studies on the e¤ects of conventional monetary policy shocks (e.g. Bernanke
and Blinder 1992; Christiano et al. 1999; Peersman and Smets 2003), is plausible for
monthly estimations, and allows to disentangle monetary policy shocks from real economy
disturbances such as aggregate supply and demand shocks.
Second, we assume that an unconventional monetary policy shock that increases the
balance sheet of the ECB does not increase nancial stress. This restriction, which embod-
ies the notion that exogenous innovations to the balance sheet have a mitigating e¤ect on
nancial stress, is required to disentangle such innovations from the endogenous response
of the balance sheet to nancial stress.10 In particular, it follows as a complementary
restriction from the assumption that central bank assets typically increase in response
to a rise in the CISS-indicator. The latter reects the idea that (i) the ECB reacts to
increased nancial stress by expanding its balance sheet, and (ii) due to the FRFA pol-
icy, the balance sheet of the ECB rises endogenously when nancial market uncertainty
increases.
Third, we assume that an expansionary balance sheet shock does not increase the
EONIA-MRO spread. Also this restriction is motivated by the FRFA policy and the
accompanying unlimited access of banks to central bank liquidity. Specically, there could
have been (exogenous) shocks to the demand for bank reserves without a policy action from
the ECB, which have lowered the CISS-indicator and augmented the size of the central
10See Gambacorta et al. (2014) for a similar reasoning. Notice that expansions in the balance sheet
which did lead to increased nancial markets volatility are not identied and hence captured by the other
innovations in the VAR.
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bank balance sheet during the sample period. A rise in the demand for bank reserves,
however, typically raises the EONIA, and hence also the EONIA-MRO spread for a given
policy rate. In contrast, an expansionary balance sheet shock that is the consequence of an
unconventional monetary policy action typically increases the liquidity surplus, exerting
downward pressure on the EONIA and the spread with the policy rate.11
Finally, given that we want to estimate the dynamic e¤ects of innovations to the ECBs
balance sheet that are orthogonal to shifts in the policy rate, the identied shocks have a
zero contemporaneous impact on the MRO-rate.
All sign restrictions are imposed on impact and the rst month after the shock, and
implemented in a weak form, i.e. as smaller/larger than or equal to zero. This allows for
the possibility that an unconventional monetary policy measure, for example, immediately
inuences the CISS-indicator, and central bank assets only with a lag. Hence, it accom-
modates for the fact that some monetary policy decisions are announced before they are
implemented.
4 Benchmark estimation results
The VAR is estimated over the sample period 2008M1-2013M12. Data were taken from the
ECB Statistical Data Warehouse and Datastream. Based on the usual lag-length selection
criteria, the estimations include four lags of the endogenous variables. Most criteria even
suggest a shorter lag length, but the results proved robust to di¤erent specications of
the lag length. We use a Bayesian approach with Gibbs sampling for estimation and
inference. The prior and posterior distributions of the reduced form VAR belong to the
Normal-Wishart family. To draw the candidate truths from the posterior, we take a
joint draw from the posteriors of the reduced form VAR parameters, as well as a random
possible decomposition B of the variance-covariance matrix. If the draw of the VAR
system is stationary and satises the restrictions, the draw is kept. Otherwise, the draw
is rejected by giving it a zero prior weight. For details of the estimation procedure and
11Notice that not all unconventional monetary policy measures imply downward pressure on the EONIA.
The impact of the SMP on liquidity, for instance, has been sterilized. Moreover, the EONIA can never
fall below the interest rate on the deposit facility of the ECB. To account for this, the sign restriction is
implemented in a weak form.
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implementation of restrictions, we refer to Peersman (2005). After a burn-in period of
5,000 draws, a total of 10,000 successful draws from the posterior are used to produce the
gures.12
4.1 Time series of exogenous balance sheet innovations
Before we discuss the dynamic e¤ects and transmission mechanism of the balance sheet
shocks, we rst examine the time series of the identied shocks. An inspection of the
time series of the shocks should help to interpret their exact source more carefully, and
assess whether the major measures taken by the ECB in the aftermath of the crisis are
captured by the estimated innovations. Figure 3 shows the cumulative time series of the
balance sheet shocks for all possible decompositions B that fulll the restrictions (light
blue area), as well as the median value (red line) for each quarter in the sample. The scale
is standard deviations innovations. By construction, the sum of the shocks is zero over
the whole sample period. A rise in the cumulative shock series implies an expansionary
balance sheet shock, while a decline reects a tightening of the balance sheet relative to
the average endogenous response to the other shocks hitting the economy.
The gure reveals that the identied shocks capture the dates of important unconven-
tional monetary policy measures. As most decisions have to some extent an unexpected
component, this indicates that our identication strategy is plausible. Examples of (series
of) expansionary balance sheet shocks identied by the VAR model are the decision of
the Governing Council to o¤er US dollar funding to Eurosystem counterparties in March
2008, the FRFA policy and the easing of collateral requirements in October 2008, both
CBPPs, the three one-year LTROs of June, September and December 2009, the three-
year LTROs of December 2011 and March 2012, the easing of collateral requirements and
the announcement that the FRFA will be continued "for as long as necessary and at least
another six months" in June 2012, and several modications to the risk control framework
in July 2013. Somewhat surprising, the start of the SMP in May 2010 and the second
phase of considerable government bond purchases under this programme in the summer
12The results prove to be robust when we estimate the reduced form VAR as in Uhlig (2005), and/or
when we use the approach of Arias, Rubio-Ramirez, and Waggoner (2014) for the implementation of the
restrictions. See also Benati (2014) for a discussion of the robustness of our results.
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of 2011 are not identied as expansionary balance sheet shocks, which implies that the
corresponding rise in the ECBs balance sheet can be fully considered as an endogenous
reaction to the ongoing macroeconomic and nancial jitters.13
The periods that are identied as restrictive balance sheet shocks are typically asso-
ciated with a lack of policy measures, despite a worsening of economic conditions and
nancial stability. Examples are the banking crisis in 2009 and the sovereign debt cri-
sis in 2011. Also the end of the one-year LTROs and completion of the rst CBPP in
June 2010 are identied as a tightening of the (unconventional) monetary policy stance.
Interestingly, the early repayments of three-year LTROs in January 2013 resulted in a
negative shock to the balance sheet of more than one standard deviation. Such negative
shock could be related to a desire by counterparties to avoid stigma attached to using the
LTROs by signaling improvements in their funding conditions (ECB 2013a) . In sum, we
can conclude that the identied balance sheet shocks make sense, and capture the most
important non-standard monetary policy measures of the ECB during the sample period.
4.2 Impulse response analysis
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses to a one-standard deviation balance sheet innova-
tion. The dotted (red) lines are the median impulse responses of the posterior distributions,
while the shaded (light blue) areas represent the 68 percent posterior probability regions
of the estimated responses. The shock is characterized by an increase in total ECB assets
between 1 and 3 percent, which fades out after about six months. While being (weakly)
imposed by the sign restriction on impact and the rst month after the shock, an ex-
pansionary balance sheet shock leads to a signicant decline of the CISS indicator that
lasts for more than one year. Also the spread between the EONIA and the MRO-rate is
assumed to fall on impact, but remains negative for about 5 months.
The dynamics of real GDP and consumer prices reveal that the unconventional balance
sheet policies conducted by the ECB in the aftermath of the nancial crisis were e¤ective
13Notice that the August 2012 announcement of the OMT programme is not identied as a balance
sheet shock either, which can be explained by the fact that this programme has not involved any actual
purchases during our sample period. Potential e¤ects are thus captured by the other innovations in the
VAR system.
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in supporting the macro-economy.14 Both variables display a signicant increase after an
expansion in the central bank balance sheet. Real GDP is found to rise with a peak e¤ect
after about one year of approximately 0.15 percentage points, and to return gradually
return to the value it would have been without the rise in the balance sheet after 18
months. Compared to the existing evidence on the transmission of conventional monetary
policy shocks that are associated with a change in the short-term interest rate, the response
pattern of output turns out to be qualitatively very similar. The impact on consumer prices
is, however, somewhat di¤erent. Specically, as can be seen in Figure 4, the pattern of
consumer prices coincides with that of the output response following a balance sheet shock,
while the impact of interest rate shocks on the price level is typically found to be very
sluggish with a peak only after about two years or more. Finally, we observe a tightening of
the policy rate after about six months, which is consistent with an endogenous conventional
monetary policy reaction that tries to stabilize output and ination uctuations.
5 Transmission channels
In this section, we analyze the transmission channels of the central bank balance sheet
shocks to the real economy in more detail. Given that borrowing and lending in the euro
area predominantly take place through the intermediation of the banking system, and
most ECB unconventional monetary policy actions were primarily aimed at inuencing
the banking sector, we rst examine the impact of the shocks on a set of bank lending
variables. In a next step, we assess whether the balance sheet policies also had an impact
on a number of nancial market variables that are not included in the benchmark model.
We do this by extending the basic SVAR model as follows:
24 Yt
Zt
35 =
24 

35+
24 A(L) 0
C(L) D(L)
3524 Yt 1
Zt 1
35+
24 B 0
E F
3524 "t
vt
35 (2)
We use a block diagonal structure to estimate the e¤ects of a balance sheet shock on
14Benati (2014) conrms this in his discussion of the paper. Specically, he shows that a more subdued
balance sheet response to nancial stress (by shrinking the parameters of the balance sheet response to the
CISS indicator) would have resulted in much more macroeconomic volatility during the sample period.
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the banking and nancial market variables, i.e. we estimate a so-called near-VAR. As
before, Yt is a vector of the benchmark endogenous variables, and B the contemporaneous
impact matrix of the shocks "t. Zt is a vector containing the banking or nancial variables
of interest. Each time, we include two (related) variables in Zt, for instance the volume of
bank lending to households and the corresponding lending rate. The variables are paired
along the rows of the gures, i.e. the two variables of a single row in the gures are each
time included as a pair in the near-VAR. We should point out, however, that the choice of
pairing does not inuence the estimates. In order to keep the balance sheet shock and the
dynamics of the benchmark variables invariant to the inclusion of the additional variables,
we assume that the banking and nancial market variables do not a¤ect the block of the
benchmark endogenous variables. This approach is very similar to Peersman and Smets
(2003), who estimate the impact of a conventional monetary policy shock on various euro
area macroeconomic variables. The CISS indicator - reecting stress in the banking system
and a wide range of asset markets - should be a su¢ cient proxy to capture the state of
nancial and banking markets.15
Bank lending The dynamic e¤ects of a balance sheet shock on a set of euro area bank
lending variables are shown in Figure 5. The results suggest that the unconventional mon-
etary policy measures of the ECB did support bank lending to households and rms during
the nancial crisis. In particular, both the volume of lending to non-nancial corporations
and households rise signicantly following an expansion in the central bank balance sheet
for a given policy rate. The peak of the response of loans to non-nancial corporations is
later than the peak of loans to households. This is in line with existing evidence, which
typically nds that loans to households coincide more with output, whereas loans to non-
nancial corporations are lagging with respect to output (ECB 2013b). These ndings are
also consistent with those of A¢ nito (2013), who nds that lending reacts positively to
changes in unconventional monetary policy using micro rm data.
The impulse responses of the interest rates charged on loans to households and rms
denote that the rise in the volume of lending is essentially supply-driven. In particular,
15As a robustness check, we have also estimated VARs where the additional variables are included in
the block of benchmark endogenous variables. The results are very similar.
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while the volume of lending increases, there is a decline of both lending rates in the
short run after an expansionary balance sheet shock. The increase in bank lending rates
after six months is in line with the endogenous reaction of the policy rate documented
before. The impact on bank lending is consistent with the existence of a bank lending
channel of balance sheet policies. This is further supported by the regular Bank Lending
Survey (BLS) conducted by the ECB on supply and demand conditions of bank loans.16
The question on supply conditions asks how the bank has changed its credit standards
for loans or credit lines to respectively households and rms. The question on demand
conditions asks how the demand for loans and credit lines by households and rms has
changed, apart from normal seasonal uctuations. The bottom part of Figure 5 shows the
impulse responses of both indices to the identied shocks. A decline in the supply index
implies a loosening of credit standards, whereas a fall in the demand index corresponds
to a decline in loan demand. The impulse responses reveal that supply conditions are
signicantly loosened after a shock to the balance sheet, in contrast to demand conditions.
The response of demand conditions for households is even negative in the short run. In
sum, the responses of the BLS data conrm that it is the supply of bank loans and not the
demand that increases after an expansion in the ECBs balance sheet, which corroborates
with a bank lending channel of monetary policy in the spirit of Bernanke and Blinder
(1988) and Kashyap and Stein (1995).
Financial markets The impact of a balance sheet shock on a number of nancial market
variables is shown in Figure 6.17 Consistent with the rise in the volume of bank loans,
there is a signicant rise of M3 after an expansionary innovation to the ECBs balance
sheet. Furthermore, there is a fall in the three-month Euribor rate, which can be explained
by the drop in the EONIA, as well as by a decline in the credit risk premium embedded
in Euribor. There is indeed a fall in the Euribor-OIS spread, which reects the favorable
impact of the balance sheet measures on the risk premium for banks in the interbank
16As the BLS is a quarterly survey, the series is linearly interpolated to ob-
tain a monthly series. For more details about the construction of the series, see
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/lend/html/index.en.html.
17A caveat of the results shown in Figure 6 is that our identication scheme weakly imposes a decline
in the composite overall measure of nancial stress (CISS) on impact. Nevertheless, it is useful to inves-
tigate whether benecial e¤ects are observed in a wide range of nancial market segments, including its
persistence.
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market. In line with this, credit default swaps for banks drop between 4 and 10 basis
points. The liquidity support of the ECB hence also lowers the probability investors
attach to a credit event in the banking sector.
Figure 6 further shows that equity prices increase after a balance sheet shock, whereas
there is a depreciation of the nominal e¤ective exchange rate of approximately 1 percent.
The latter is consistent with an exchange rate channel of the balance sheet policies. Finally,
we nd that a balance sheet shock has a negative impact on euro area sovereign bond
yields, which can be explained by several factors. On the one hand, the term premium
could fall, as the rise in liquidity might lead investors to rebalance their portfolios towards
longer-term assets. On the other hand, the fall in the sovereign yield could also reect
a drop in the credit risk premium. Since we use an aggregate euro area bond yield also
comprising risky sovereign bonds, the yield also contains credit risk. There is for instance
evidence (e.g. Acharya and Ste¤en 2013) that in response to the ample ECB liquidity,
many banks have bought government bonds of euro area countries under nancial stress,
and that this has lowered the spread between the yields of these countries and the German
Bund. As can be seen in Figure 6, this hypothesis is conrmed by the impulse response
of the sovereign yield spread vis-à-vis Germany.
6 The e¤ects across euro area countries
It may be useful to also analyze how individual euro area countries are a¤ected by the
balance sheet shocks. For that purpose, we include output and consumer prices of each
individual country in the Z-block of the near-VAR presented in Section 5.18 The e¤ects on
economic activity turn out to be quite diverse. Figure 7 shows that the e¤ects of a central
bank balance sheet shock on output are relatively large in Germany, Finland, Estonia,
Ireland, Slovenia, Slovak Republic and Luxemburg. The e¤ects are much more subdued
in France, Italy, Austria and Belgium. The estimations further reveal that the impact of
the unconventional monetary policy measures of the ECB were negligible in Spain, the
18Since individual countries are part of the euro area aggregate, it is not necessary to allow for feedback
of the individual countries on the euro area variables. We can thus again use a block diagonal VAR system,
which ensures that the dynamics of the euro area variables are invariant to the inclusion of the individual
country variables, allowing for a comparison across countries (see also Peersman and Smets 2003).
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Netherlands, Portugal and Cyprus. For Greece, we even nd a puzzling negative response
of output to a balance sheet expansion. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 8, the
e¤ects on consumer prices are much more similar across countries. Hence, there is little
evidence that in countries where output reacts more (less), also ination reacts more (less).
An explanation for such a di¤erent Phillips-curve type relationship across countries is not
straithforward and would need additional analysis, but this is out of the scope of this
paper.
Since the peripheral countries of the euro area participated relatively more in the non-
standard monetary policy actions of the ECB, the nding that the e¤ects of expansionary
(and restrictive) central bank balance sheet shocks turn out to be stronger in countries
that are generally less a¤ected by the nancial crisis is striking. A potential explanation
is that a lot of banks in peripheral countries have not been able to convert the extra
liquidity into more lending to the private sector because of their nancial fragility and low
capitalization. In particular, it is di¢ cult for banks to increase lending supply if they are
capital-constrained. Accordingly, the macroeconomic e¤ects of the balance sheet policies
could be more subdued in countries where banks are on average less capitalized. This
conjecture is supported by the data shown in Figure 9. The gure plots the correlation
between bank capital and the estimated e¤ects of the balance sheet shocks on output and
bank lending across individual countries. Given that correlation does not mean causation,
we have to be careful when interpreting the results, but they are nevertheless informative
about a potential relationship. More specically, there is a strong positive correlation
(0.78) between the (maximum) impact of an innovation to the ECBs balance sheet on
economic activity in an individual country and the average Tier 1 capital ratio of the
respective consolidated national banking system over the sample period. Similarly, there
is a positive correlation between bank capital and the rise in bank lending to households
and rms after an expansion in the ECBs balance sheet, in particular lending to non-
nancial corporations.19 In other words, the solvency of the banking system seems to be
important for the transmission of central bank liquidity support to the real economy. If
19 Impulse responses of lending to non-nancial corporations and households in individual countries are
shown in respectively Figures A1 and A2. The responses are estimated by including both variables in Zt
of the near-VAR model.
16
the central bank injects liquidity but banks are not able or willing to lend to households
and rms because of their own nancial fragility, the e¤ects on economic activity are more
subdued. As a consequence, countries with a weakly capitalized banking system also react
less to the unconventional monetary policies of the ECB.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the e¤ectiveness and transmission of the ECBs unconven-
tional monetary policies since the onset of the nancial crisis. Within an SVAR framework,
we have identied exogenous innovations to the central bank balance sheet for a given pol-
icy rate, and estimated the dynamic e¤ects on the macro-economy. We nd that euro area
output and prices rise after an increase in the balance sheet of the ECB. The e¤ects are
qualitatively very similar to the impact of conventional monetary policy, in particular the
output e¤ects. This conrms that unconventional monetary policy actions that inuence
the size of the central bank balance sheet can be e¤ective at stabilizing the economy.
Financial market and bank lending variables also react signicantly to central bank
balance sheet disturbances. We nd that equity prices, lending volumes, and broad money
rise after an expansionary balance sheet shock, whereas sovereign yields, the intra-euro
area sovereign bond spread vis-à-vis Germany, bank lending rates, bank CDSs, and money
market rates fall. Financial markets and banks are thus important in passing on ECB
unconventional monetary policy to the real economy. Based on survey responses of banks
about their lending standards, we can conclude that the increase in bank lending coincides
with a loosening of lending standards, and not so much with an increase in loan demand.
The identied unconventional monetary policy shock seems to a¤ect euro area countries
di¤erently. Specically, output reacts more in countries that have been less a¤ected by
the nancial crisis. The di¤erential reaction of output across countries turns out to be
strongly correlated with the degree of capitalization of the national banking sector. Output
increases more in countries with a relatively better capitalized banking sector. If conrmed
by further research, this nding implies that focusing policies solely on providing bank
funding and liquidity might not be very benecial in a weakly-capitalised banking system.
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In that case, policies aimed at addressing the capital constraints should also be put in
place. Such policies can be conducted by the central bank, for instance through purchases
of risky or impaired assets which do provide capital relief, although that would imply a
broad interpretation of its tasks. An alternative is to resort to prudential and, if necessary,
scal policies in order to ensure bankscapital bases are adequate. In this respect, the
comprehensive assessment of 130 banksnancial health that has been conducted by the
ECB over the course of 2014 and the remedial action following it, should help to safeguard
a proper monetary policy transmission mechanism, including that of balance sheet policies.
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Figure 1 - Balance sheet of the ECB (assets) in the aftermath of the financial crisis
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Figure 2 - ECB balance sheet and financial stress in the euro area
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Figure 3 - Time series of cumulative identified balance sheet shocks
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
sh
oc
ks
 (s
ta
nd
ar
d 
de
vi
at
io
n)
(100%) Lower + upper bound cumulative shocks
Median of cumulative shocks
full allotment 
decision + easing of  
collateral 
1-year LTRO + start first 
covered bond purchase 
progam
Extension of full-
allotment
3-year LTROs + 
easing collateral
requirements
No policy 
interventions +  
communication
that measures 
will be unwound 
as soon as 
possible
More restrictive collateral rules 
+ no interventions  during 
sovereign debt crisis 
Maturing 1-year 
LTRO and 
completion first 
covered bond
purchase program
Continuation of full-
allotment "for as long as 
necessary" + easing  
collateral requirements
ECB offered US 
dollar funding to 
European banks
1-year LTRO 
Start second covered 
bond purchase progam
Early repayments 3-year LTROs 
(desire of banks to show 
repayment capacity)
Several modifications to 
risk control framework
24
Figure 4 - Impulse responses to balance sheet shocks in the euro area
Note: figures show median responses, together with 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution; horizon is monthly
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Figure 5 - Impact of balance sheet shocks on bank lending in the euro area
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Note: figures show median responses, together with 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution; horizon is monthly
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Figure 6 - Impact of balance sheet shocks on financial market variables in the euro area
M3 Bank CDS rate (basis points)
Euro area sovereign bond yield Spread euro area - German sovereign bond yield
Note: figures show median responses, together with 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution; horizon is monthly
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Figure 7 - Impact of balance sheet shocks on output in individual member countries
Note: figures show median responses, together with 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution; horizon is monthly
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Figure 8 - Impact of balance sheet shocks on consumer prices in individual member countries
Note: figures show median responses, together with 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution; horizon is monthly
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Figure 9 - Bank capital and the effects of balance sheet shocks on output and bank lending in euro area countries
Note: figures show correlations between Tier 1 Capital ratio of National banking sector and maximum estimated effects of balance sheet shocks (median impulse responses) on output and bank lending variables in member country
Correlation = 0,78 Correlation = 0,65 Correlation = 0,48
Correlation = 0,68 Correlation = 0,50
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Figure A1 - Impact of balance sheet shocks on the volume of loans to non-financial corporations in individual member countries
Note: figures show median responses, together with 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution; horizon is monthly
Estonia Cyprus Slovenia Slovak Republic
Italy Spain
Netherlands Finland
Luxemburg Greece
Germany France
Austria Belgium
Ireland Portugal
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
-0.6
-0.3
0.0
0.3
0.6
0 6 12 18 24
31
Figure A2 - Impact of balance sheet shocks on the volume of loans to households in individual member countries
Note: figures show median responses, together with 16th and 84th percentiles of the posterior distribution; horizon is monthly
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